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AMERI CJ.'.N S UNTD . FOR 
cert to CA3 (Adams; Rosenn, 
concurring; Weis, dissenti-ng) 
SEPARATN. CH. & ST., ET AL. Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Whether resps, who cannot demonstrate injury 
to themselves as taxpayers, have standing t o challenge the 
~ ~I 
transfer of federal property to petr, a rel i gious organization. 
2. FAC~S AND DECISIONS BELOW: In 1976, HEW conveyed to 
petr, an allegedly sectarian college, 77 ac r es of s urplus 
IN_~ 
C{t_3 ~ 
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federal property, as well as the· building~ and equipment 
situated thereon. The property was transferred pursunnt to the 
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 
U.S.C. § 484(k), which authorizes HEW to sell or lease surplus 
gvt property to tax-exempt institutions for health and 
educational purposes; in accordance with the Act, the property 
was deeded to the petr in return for its commitment to use the 
property in a manner beneficial to the public. Petr thus made 
no financial payment for the property. 
In 1977, an action was instituted in the USDC for ED Pa. 
against petr and HEW by resps, a non-profit organization 
dedicated to the separation of church and state, and four of 
its individual directors, who are citizens and taxpayers of the 
u.s. Resps claimed that the transfer of this property to petr 
violated the Establishment Clause, and sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief to void the transfer. The DC (Ditter, DJ) 
dismissed the suit on the ground that resps lacked standing to 
sue as taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392 u.s. 83 (1968), 
since they challenged an exercise of Congress's property power, 
U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl.2, rather than its taxing and 
spending power, Art. I, § 8. The DC held that resps also 
lacked standing under Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop 
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1975), because they failed to allege 
that they had suffered any actual or concrete injury beyond a 
generalized grievance common to all taxpayers. 
· CA3 reversed. The CA accepted ~he DC's conclusion that 
( resps lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the transfer. 
Nonetheless, the ct held that resps had stancling to sue because 
• - : r; • 
- 3 -. .... - -they alleged a personal "injury in fact" to an interest ....._ ____ ..........__ ____________ _ 
protected by the Establishment Clause -- their "shared -----·--
individuated right" to a gvt that "shall make no law respecting 
the establishment of religion." Resps thus had a sufficient 
"personal stake in the outcome" to assure a complete 
perspective on the issues. Flast did not require a different 
result, for in that case, unlike here, the pltffs had alleged 
injury only to their economic interests. Li kewise, this cas e 
is distinguishable from Schlesinger and u.s. v. Richardson, 418 
u.s. 166 (1974), for unlike the general constitutional 
limitations at issue there, the First Amendment creates legal 
rights in individuals that may be vindicated in the courts. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn concluded that resps 
"have standing because they possess the necessary adversity of 
(: interest, and, as a practical matter, no one is better suited 
~.-~ .... -.. -
to bring this lawsuit and vindicate the freedoms embodied in 
the Establishment Clause." Judge Rosenn reasoned that because 
the First Amendment is designed to protect against abuses by 
. . 
political majorities, it must not depend upon the political 
processes for protection. 
Judge Weis dissented on the ground that "a generalized 
grievance brought by concerned citizens seeking to enforce a 
~------------------------~----------~ particular constitutional guarantee has been deemed too 
abstract to satisfy the injury in fact component of standing." 
He noted that the Flas~ majority had not accepted Justice 
Fortas's suggestion that "[p]erhaps the vita l interest of a 
citizen in the establishment issue, without reference to his 
taxpayer's status, would be acceptable as a basis for this 
- 4 -. . 
challenge." 392 u.s. at 115-16. In his view, then, the . 
~-~-( _ majority had embraced a concept of standing that had been 
( 
presented to and rejected by this Court. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the ct below 
repudiates Flast, and formulates instead a standing doctrine 
that is in conflict both with this Court's recent standing 
decisions and with CADC's decision ·in Amer-ican Jewish Con~es s 
v. Vance, 575 F.2d 939 (CADC 1978) (no "citizen standingn to 
challenge federal program under First and Fifth Amendments). 
As both the DC and the CA below realized, resps fail the first 
prong of the Flast test, for they cannot demonstrate a logical 
nexus between their status as taxpayers and the transfer of 
this property pursuant to the Property Clause. This Court has 
consistently held that there is no taxpayer standing to 
challenge congressional actions not based on the taxing and 
spending power. See Richardson (challenge under Art. I, § 9, 
cl. 7 to CIA's secret budget): Schlesinger (~hallenge under 
Art. I, § 6, cl.2 to members of Congress holding reserve 
commissions). The Court has also refused to recognize citizen 
standing to assert "abstract injury" arising from nonobservance 
of the Constitution. See Schlesinger, 418 u.s. at 223. Resps 
are ideological pltffs. The only injury the individual resps 
allege in their complaint is to their status as taxpayers: the 
organizational resp asserts its special interest in maintaining 
the separation of church and state. But see Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (organization must seek relief for 
injury to itself or associational ties of members). Thus, in 
contrast to the pltffs in Bake r v. Carr, 36 9 u.s. 186 
. . . . . . 
( 
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(1962} (voting rights} and Schempp v. Abington School Dist~, 374 
u.s. 203 (1963} (classroom prayer}, resps do not assert any 
concrete injury in fact. This case cannot be distinguished 
from Schlesinge= and Richardson. 
Resps contend that the decision below is consistent with 
this Court's opinions, as well as the opinions of other CAs. 
Resps essentially adopt the reasoning of CA3. In addition, 
they contend that Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970}, makes clear that a person "may have a 
spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give 
standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause 
" Similarly, in Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 946 (CADC 
1970}, a challenge to the construction of a Christmas creche on 
r federal land, CADC recognized that this Court has been 
\ 
( 
particularly ready "to find standing conferred by non-economic 
values in order to consider issues concerning the Establishment 
Clause " Resps also argue the merits of their claims that 
the transfer constituted an unconstitutional transfer of 
federal funds and created an impermissible entanglement. 
Finally, they assert that they should have standing just as the 
pltffs did in Flast, since the gvt is simply doing here 
indirectly aiding a sectarian institution what it could 
not do directly. 
The SG submits that CA3 has decided a "difficult and novel" 
question of standing that was left open in ~last. Normally, 
standing to sue in Establishment ciause cases exists either 
because taxpayer funds have been spent to aid religion, see 
Flast, or because the challenged actions di r ectly impinge on 
the interests of the pltff, see Sche~. This Court has made 
clear that there 1S no "citizen standing" to itigate 
generalized constitutional complaints. Nonetheless, the 
· constitutional claims raised here differ in some respects from 
those in Richardson and Schlesinger, which involved claims of 
violations of constitutional provisions concering the internal 
processes of gvt, rather than violations of the Bill of 
Rights. However, the SG argues that there is no need to 
undertake the difficult task of reexamining Establishment 
Clause standing in this case. The decision here does not 
conflict with any decision of this Court or any other CA; 
Vance, on which .petr relies, did not consider the question 
presented here. Moreover, the decision here is interlocutory, 
and may have only limited practical consequences, since many 
Establishment Clause suits already proceed on the basis of the 
r- principles established in Flast and Schempp. Accordingly, cert 
'· 
/ 
should be denied. 
4. DISCUSSION: I recommend a grant. The decision below 
announces a theory of "citizen standing" that is arguably in 
conflict with the principles set forth in Richardson and 
Schlesinger. The SG's assertion that there is no conflict here 
rests on the questionable premise that this Court's cases 
indicate that there is citizen . standing to assert the violation 
of some constitutional provisions, but not others. But see 
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 226-27. Similarly, the SG's argument 
that this case may have little practical effect assumes that 
its importance is restricted to the Establi s~ment Clause 
context; however, the reasoning of ·the court below suggests 
that there is citizen standing to challenge violations of other 
- 7 -~-----------------------------------------
'-
provisions of the Bill of Rights as well. Finally, that the 
decision below is interlocutory is not dispositive; Richardson 
· carne before the Court in the same procedural posture. 
There are two responses. 
11/18/80 Swartz op in petn 
( ---: 
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Mr. Justice Brennan 
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Mr. Just~~e Powell 
Mr. Just1ce Stevens 
From: Kr. Justice Rehnquist 
Ciroula ted: _..::....;F£=8~1....,.8_198=-.;1'---
Recirculated: ____________ _ 
Re: No 80-327--Valley Forge Christian College et. al. v. 
Amercians United for Separation of Church and State 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
In this case, a divided Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that respondents, though lacking t~ayer standing, 
I( \' 
had standing in their capacity as "citizens" to challenge 
governmental conduct as violative of the Establishment Clause of 
the First~Amendment. The concurring opinion found standing, 
because in its view respondents were "likely to be the best 
available" plaintiffs and if "they do not have standing, it is 
probable that the" conduct at issue here "would be placed beyond 
judicial review." App. to Pet. for Cert. at 34. Because I think 
the decision below implicitly overrules a long line of our cases 
. . . v h' beg1nn1ng w1th Frot 1ngham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), 
decided more than a half century ago, and because I agree with 




the dissent in this case that "[i]f the basic principles of 
standing prove to be unworkable or undesirable, then it is the 
' 
Supreme Court and not a court of appeals that has the right to 
change them," App. to Pet. for Cert. at 41, I would grant the 
petition for certiorari and set the case for argument . 
Respondents, an organization dedicated to the principle of 
separation of church and state, challenge the transfer by the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare to petitioner Valley 
Forge Christian College of certain surplus federal land, 
buildings and equipment . The Government deeded the property to 
the college pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative 
Servlces Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C . 471 et seq., which authorizies 
governmental agencies to dispose of surplus property to private 
citizens who promise to use the property in a manner beneficial 
to the public. Respondents brought suit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging 
that the conveyance of federal property to a church-affiliated 
school violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
. ' 
. •" ~. 
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The District Court dismissed for lack of standing to sue, 
reasoning that respondents could not show the necessary nexus 
between the challenged action and their economic interest as 
taxpayers to meet the narrow test of "taxpayer" standing 
articulated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), since the 
college received surplus property rather than a grant of funds 
under the Spending Power. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Although the court agreed 
with the District Court that respondents lacked standing to sue 
as "taxpayers", it nonetheless asserted that respondents had 
standing to sue based on "a personal constitutional right" to be 
free of governmentally established religion. It claimed that "an 
allegation of injury in fact to an interest protected by the 
Establishment Clause is all that is required for standing." App. 
to Pet. for Cert. at 28. Judge Rosenn concurred, finding that 
that respondents had the necessary adversity of interest and that 
"as a practical matter, no one is better suited to bring this 
lawsuit and thus vindicate the freedoms embodied in the 
- 4 -
Establishement Clause." Id. at 31. Judge Weis dissented from 
the court's novel formulation of standing doctrine. He 
emphasized that that a "generalized grievance brought by 
concerned citizens seeking to enforce a particular constitutional 
guarantee has been deemed too abstract to satisfy the injury in 
fact component of standing. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee 
to Stop the War, 418 u.s. 208 (1974); United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) ." Id. at 36. 
No one can be unsympathetic to the attempt of any court of 
appeals judge to make sense out of our opinions dealing with 
standing~ ~ Nevertheless, I think it clear that the court below --------
has plainly embraced a concept of standing totally at odds with 
the decisions of this Court. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 
(1968), for example, we considered and rejected the very 
reasoning adopted by the court below. The plaintiffs there -----asserted that an expenditure of federal funds for sectarian 
schools violated the Establishment Clause. 
'----....,_... 
Although Justice 
Fortas suggested that "perhaps the vital interest of a citizen in 
l' ... ·"<l. ' I 
-
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the establishment issue, without reference to his taxpayer's 
status, would be accpetable as a basis for this challenge", Id. 
115-116 (Fortas, J. concurring), this Court declined to adopt 
that suggestion. Instead, the Court constructed an elaborate 
formula for determining when "taxpayers" had standing. Had we 
agreed with the doctrine of standing suggested by Justice Fortas, 
... ----
and adopted by the court below, we would not have found it 
necessary to consider the scope and extent of "taxpayer" 
standing. Indeed, the Court expressly reaffirmed the principle 
articulated in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) 
precludin~a taxpayer's use of "a federal court as a forum in 
which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of 
government or the allocation of power in the Federal System." 
Id., at 106. 
Since then we have consistently admonished that a citizen 
who suffers equally with all other citizens will not be heard to 
raise generalized grievances about the conduct of the Government . . 
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, we held 
··. 
- 6 -
that plaintiffs as citizens lacked standing to challenge the 
holding of military commissions by members of Congress. We 
explained that all citizens share equally an interest in 
constitutional government and that such a "generalized interest" 
was insufficient to confer standing. We held that 
standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interst of the 
kind alleged here which is held in common by all members of the 
public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury 
all citizens share. Concrete injury, whether actual or 
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which 
serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capaole . of 
judicial resolution. Id., at 220. · 
Similarly, in United States v. Richardson we found a lack of 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Central 
Intelligence Agency' "secret budget". We repeated the necessity 
for plaintiffs to allege "particular concrete injury as a result 
of the operation of this statute," and stressed that ideological 
plaintiffs with simply a "mere 'interest in a problem'" or 
"generalizied grievance" will not be permitted to assert a public 
interest in a constitutional claim. Id., at 177-180 (quoting 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 u.s. 727 (1972). The case of Abington 
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 205 (1963), so heavily 
re.lied on by the majority and concurring opinionsL is not to the 
'- . 
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contrary. In that case plaintiffs demonstrated that something 
more than their mere interest as a "citizen" standing was stake: 
children adhering to the faith of Jehovah's Witnesses were 
compelled to salute the flag at a public school, thereby being 
forced either to violate their own faith or disobey School Board 
resolutions. Id., at 624, 626. 
The court below accurately notes that standing barriers have 
been substantially lowered in the last three decades. But that 
does not ~ean that no barriers to "public actions" remain or that 
those barriers are not sound. It is one thing to rely, as did 
the major1ty here, on Chief Justice Marshall's statement in 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 u.s. 87,192 (1803) that "[t]he very essence 
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
' individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury." App.to Pet. for Cert. at 30. It is quite 
another matter to conjure up an ~injury" every time a plaintiff 
feels that some act of some government agency at some time or 
place violates some specified provision of the Constitution. The 
- 8 -
fact remains that, contrary to the finding of the court below, 
the relief available to respondents here consists entirely of the 
vindication of rights held in common by all citizens. 
It would be perhaps more frank and more candid to say, as 
Judge Rosenn did here, that if respondents do not have standing, 
"it is probable that the transfer of property at issue here, and 
other similar transfers •••• would be placed beyond judicial 
review." ~' at 34. But the flaw with that argument of course 
is that our decisions in Frothingham v. Mellon, Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, and United States v. 
Richardson, clearly contemplated, and were not alarmed by, the 
fact that some violations of the Constitution might go 
unredressed. Those cases recognizied that the Article III 
jurisdiction conferred upon this Court and such other courts that 
Congress might create was confined to "cases and controversies." 
The limitation of standing to actual cases and controversies 
guarantees that those who have nothing more at stake than their 
interest as a "eitzen" are not allowed to roam at large through 




statute books, codes of regulations, and the like, in order to 
litigate whether any particular statute or regulation of which 
they disapprove affronts the provisions of the United States 
Constitution. In short, the conclusion of the court below--that 
certain provisions of the Constitution should be enforceable upon 
demand by every individual--seriously threatens the "proper 
functioning both of the federal courts and of the principle of 
the separation of powers." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 129 n.l8 
(Harlan, J. dissenting). As we recognized in Schlesinger v. 
- Reservists Committee to Stop the War, "the proposition that all 
constituti-onal provision are enforceable by any citizen simply 
because citizens are the ulitmate beneficiaries of those 
provisions has no boundaries." 418 u.s. at 227. Because I 
believe that the decision below is contrary to a long line of 
cases and because I think it gives a license to the judiciary to 
exercise some amporhous general supervision over the operations 
of government, United States v. Richardson, supra at 188-197 
(Powell, J. concurring), I dissent from the denial of certiorari 
·-- ....--- .... ~~ ·~fl"""· 't" -- --.---·-~--~.-,-. 
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and would set the case for plenary review. 
. 







JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
..§uprtnu <!fomt ttf tqt ~nittb- ~l1iftg 
...a:lllyhtghm. ~. <!f. 2ll,?.l!~ 
February 19, 1981 
j 
Re: No. 80-327 - Valley Forge Christian College 
v. Americans United 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:§u:prme <!J!!ur± of ~e ~w ~tateg 
~lyi:ngilln. ~· <!J. zogrJt~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . wHITE February 19, 1981 
Re: 80-327 - Valley Forge Christian 
College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me in your dissent . 
Sincer~~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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2ifa.sqmgtcn. ~· <!f. 20~'!;l 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE February 19 1 1981 
REP 80-327- Valley Forge Christian College v. _' 
Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State 
Dear Bill: 
Add me to your "dissent" which appears to make 
this a "grant." 
Regards, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
'I. 
"'' 
February 19, 1981 
No. 80-327 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
united 
Dear Bill: 
Although I would much prefer to grant and reverse 
this case summarily, unless this can be done, please add my 
name to your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely, 
_, 
Mr: Justice Rehnquist 
LFP/lab 
Copies to the Conference 
,. .. , .. _ -~-----------
'· 
,. 
February 20, 1981 
Court Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 . . . 
VALLEY FORGE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE 
vs. 
AMERICANS UNITED 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell October 13, 1981 
From: John Wiley 
No. 80-327: Valley Forge Christian 
College, et al. v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., et al. 
~~~A,Wif)f W<.. ~ 
~ ./-......._ 41« &-c..L""' <A,, .7 ;R ,., th• ...... -< 
lr,___ Question Presented ~~ ~ -. 
--7~':C, 
Whether the Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State (AUSCS) has standing to assert an Establishment 
Clause violation arising from the federal government's transfer 





Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution 
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Terri tory and other Property 





The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 
40 U.S.C. §471 et seq., sets forth a procedure for disposing of 
surplus federal property. If neither Congress nor other 
agencied indicate a need for the property, the Secretary of 
Education, by regulation, is to publicize and sell the property 
so as to produce the greatest public 
educational institutions are entitled 
benefit. Nonprofit 
to a reduction 
~~~ 
in ~-
purchase price known as the "public benefit allowance." 
In this case, the u.s. government followed these 
procedures for the Valley Forge General Hospital, a facility 
built to provide medical care for members of the armed 
services. It conveyed 77 acres of land, worth about half a 
million dollars, to the Valley Forge Christian College (VFCC}, 
an educational institution operated by a religious order known 
as the Assembly of God that "places considerable emphasis on 
religious instruction and values in some of its classes and 
that • • prepares some of its students for the ministry." 
S.G. brief at 9 n.6. The government conveyed the land to VFCC 
II ., 
in fee simple. VFCC paid nothing for the property as the 
<Jtpoublic benefit allowanc~ was set at 100~ Certain conditions ~"1 -
subsequent required the college to ~~he land exclusively for ~ 
specified educational purposes for 30 years. VFCC then 
~ 
relocated its campus onto the 77 acre tract and converted th~ 
hospital to a college. AUSCS learned of the transfer through a 
new> release and sued to challenge the conveyance in 1976. It 
f\ 
complaint named as plaintiffs itself and four individuals that 
.. , •' 
3. 
it employed in executive positions. The DC dismissed the 
complaint for want of standing. 
A divided panel of 
,.....,. 
the CA3 reversed. Judge Adams 
#L '' 
agreed that resp lacked taxpayer standing. He found, however, CI!J z.. - ( 2.- 1) 
that resp's interest in the separation of church and state was ~
sufficiently particular and concrete to be injured in fact~ 
the conveyance in question. Judge Rosenn concurred in a 
separate statement. Judge Weis dissented. 
II. Discussion 
This is an easy case for you. Precedents control it, 
and your concurrence in United States v. Richardson, 418 u.s. 
166, 180 (1974) makes clear you are not inclined to expand 
further the law of standing. You therefore should vote to 
reverse. 
The CA3 unanimously agreed that resps did not 
taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 u.s. 83 
possess ")4..0 
~J"-[4/ 
( 19 6 8) • 41-. <I. , . .,
This is a significant holding, as your Richarson concurrence 
stated your willingness--for reasons of stare decisis--to allow 
Flast to stand "on its facts • II Id. at 180. You set 
forth your belief, however, that the Court "should limit the 
expansion of federal taxpayer and citizen standing in the 
absence of specific statutory authorization to an outer 
boundary drawn by the results in Flast and Baker v. Carr." Id. 
at 196 (emphasis in original). By attacking an executive 






and Spending Clause, this case steps beyond Flast's result. It 
consequently errs under the rationale of your Richarson 
concurrence. 
The CA3 in fact based its holding on notions of 
standing that transgress established case law. I will not 
spend much of your time developing this point, as it has been 
argued forcefully--and I think correctly--both in Judge Weis's 
dissent and by Justice Rehnquist in his proposed dissent from --denial of cert in this Court. (As you recall, it was this 
proposed dissent that prompted the grant in this case.) In 
short, the CA3 decision adopts the rationale proposed by 
Justice Fortas but rejected by the majority in Flast. It 
I I •' 
permits a group to air a generalized grievance without alleging 
"some particularlized injury that sets him apart from the man 
on the street." Id. at 194. It is justified by the logic that 
someone must be available to redress every constitutional 
infringement. But this proposition has been explicitly and 
repeatedly rejected by the Court. See Richardson, 418 u.s. at 
179: Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the war, 418 u.s. 208, 
227 (1974). Finally, I think the SG effectively rebuts resps' 
tardy claim of A.P.A. standing. See SG Reply Brief at 17-18. 
The reasoning necessary to settle this case is 
sufficiently plain from prior cases to permit brief per curiam 
treatment (assuming, of course, that a majority agrees with 
this view of the case). 
.. ~· " 
..• 
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CHAMBERS OF J .JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 3, 1981 
Re: No. 80-327 - Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Dear Bill: 
Americans United For Separation 
of Church and State, Inc. 




cc: The Conference 
.. 
CH AM BE R S OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST 
........, 
:§u.puuu ~aurt of tftr ~tti:ttb :§hrltl'f 
'Jlttsftington, :!Q. ~· 20,?J.I..;1 
~- December 3 , 198 1 
Re: No . 80-32 7 Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United , et al . 
Dear Sandra : 
In accordance with our conversation , I am circulating 
to the three others who voted to reverse Valley Forge , which 
I was a ssigned and of which a proposed opinion for the 
Court is pres e ntly in circulation , as to whether we should 
e xpressly overrule Flast v. Cohen . I wrote the opinion so 
as to confine Flast in accordance with my sense of the 
Conference view that there were not five solid votes t o 
overrule it , but if the Chief , Lewis , and Byron are willing 
to overrule it , I am certainly willing to rewrite the 
opinion so as to accomplish that result . 
Justice O'Connor 
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CHAMB E RS OF 
_,_._ 
I 
;§Itprtmt ~ourl of t~t ~1niftb ~air:; 
~'t-r~slyi:ngton, J}3. ~· :W;J.l!-2 I~C:IVt:L) 
~: ' i.' ;i .::!:S CF THE 
.: .. i~F JUSTICE 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
l '· 
December 3, 1981 
Re: No. 80-327 Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United, et al. 
Dear Sandra: 
In accordance with our conversation, I am circulating 
to the three others who voted to reverse Valley Forge, which 
I was assigned and of which a proposed opinion for the 
Court is presently in circulation, as to whether we should 
expressly overrule Flast v. Cohen. I wrote the opinion so 
as to confine Flast in accordance with my sense of the 
Conference view that there were not five solid votes to 
overrule it, but if the Chief, Lewis, and Byron are willing 
to overrule it, I am certainly willing to rewrite the 
opinion so as to accomplish that result. 
Justice O'Connor 





JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~uvrtmt <!Jcurf ttf fqt ,ni.ttb ~taft%' 
~curlyhtgf!ln,~. <q. 2ll.?~~ 
December 3, 1981 
No. 80-327 Valley Forge Christian College 
Dear Bill, 
v. Americans United for Separation 
of Church and State, Inc. 
Please join me in your opinion in the referenced 
case. If you find s~fficient support among the other 
Justices, I am still vwilling to go further and overrule 
Flast v. Cohen. " 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
,• 
December 3, 1981 
.~ 
·~ 1 
80-327 Valley Forge v. Americans Uni.ted 
Dear Bill: 
~ . . 
I have noted with interest Sandra's suggestion 
that she is "willinq to go further and overrule Flast v. 
Cohen." 
I continue to think for the reasons stated in my 
concurrinq opinion in Richardson that Flast waa an unsound 
opinion. Overruling it therefore has a gooa deal of appeal. 
Yet, I have some hesitation as to the desirability of doing 
this by a bare majority vote. Flast - a 1968 decision - was 
decided with only one dissenting vote. 
Moreover, your current draft in this case leaves 
Flast a "bare bones" precedent with little or no force 
beyond its specific facts. In sum, although I would be 
happy to join five others, I think there are institutional 
reasons for not overruling it lf four Justices are in 
dissent. · 
I am happy to join Bill's opinion as written. 
Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 

















j\u:prrnu <!faurlaf tfrt ~~ j\ftth_g 
~zwlpnghtn.l9. (!}. zo~J!~ 
JUSTICE Wt<. J . BRENNAN, JR. December 3, 1981 / 
RE: No. 80-327 Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Dear Bill: 
Americans United for Separation 
of Church and State, Inc. ,et al. 
I shall shortly be circulating a dissent in the 
above . 
Justice Rehnquist 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.:§upr.cutt <!j:tturl ttf fl!t ~dt ~faf.tg 
'J]liasfringLm. ~. <!J:. 20~JI.~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.• 
December 3, 1981 
Re: No. 80-327 Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United, et al. 
Dear Sandra: 
You, the Chief and I are all willing to overrule Flast; 
Lewis has said that he thought he could agree to it but Byron 
is unwilling to do it. I would prefer a five member court 
opinion in its present analysis rather than a plurality 
opinion with one concurrence in the result , and unless 
otherwise pressured by resistance will leave the opinion 
in substantially its present shape . 
Justice O'Connor 






Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: WJB's dissent in Valley Forge Christian College 
Justice Brennan has circulated a lengthy and, at 
points, heated dissent in this standing case. The key to his 
position is expressed in Part IIB (pages 13-19). This section 
argues that the Constitution creates a special taxpayer right 
to be free from taxation that measurably supports religion. 
The most powerful portion of this dissent is at pages 16-17, 
where Justice Brennan recounts the colonial efforts of Madison 
and Jefferson in securing passage of the Virginia Religious 
Freedom law--the text of which does support Just ice Brennan 
position. See page 16 ("no man shall be compelled to • 
support any religious • ministry whatsoever") (emphasis 
added). 
Justice Brennan's dissent essentially seeks to revise 
the rationale of Flast to separate Flast's Establishment Clause 
standing holding--which Justice Brennan enthusiastically 
supports--from its much-criticized and more general two-part 
nexus test. See WJB dissent at 21-22 ("The two-pronged 'nexus' 
test offered by the Court, despite its general language, is 
best understood as 'determinant of standing of plaintiffs al-







tions of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the 
First Amendment,' and not as a general statement of standing 
principles."} (footnote deleted and emphasis added}. Yet this 
narrowing revision is incomplete in two respects. First, as 
the emphasized portion of this quote illustrates, Justice Bren-
nan believes Flast must also convey federal taxpayer standing 
in Free Exercise Clause cases--even though these would expand 
on Flast' s holding. This belief is consistent with the his-
torical basis for his position. Second, Justice Brennan also 
suggests that the general two part nexus test may have some 
continuing vitality. See dissent at 22 n.l7 ("In the years 
since the announcement of the Flast test we have yet to recog-
nize a similar restriction on Congress' power to tax, and I 
know of none. Nevetheless, like the Justices who joined in the 
Court opinion in Flast, I remain reluctant to rule out the pos-
sibility."}. 
You have previously written that you "would not over-
rule Flast on its facts, because it is now settled that federal 
taxpayer standing exists in Establishment Clause cases." Unit-
ed States v. Richardson, 418 u.s. 166, 180 (1974}. Even though 
I find Justice Brennan's thinking in the context of the Estab-
lishment Clause to be persuasive, the implications of his posi-
tion clash with your previously expressed views. Unless you 
---are willing to expand your statement in Richardson to include 
Free Exercise cases, ?Justice Brennan's dissent is apt not to 
appeal to you. I there ore recommend that you continue to join 
Justice Rehnquist. ~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.:§u:pttmt <!Jo-url trf tltt 'JlUrifdt %ta±t.9' 
~~n. tE. <!J. 202~~ 
December 3, 1981 
Re: 80-327 - Valley Forge Christian College 
v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, Inc. 
Dear Bill , 
Please join me. I would not overrule Flast. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-327 
VALLEY FORGE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE, PETI-
TIONER v. AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION 
OF CHURCH AND STATE, INC., ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1981] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
I 
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution vests 
Congress with the "Power to dispose of and make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the ... Property belong-
ing to the United States." Shortly after the termination of 
hostilities in the Second World War, Congress enacted the 
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 
63 Stat. 377, 40 U. S. C. §471 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. 
III). The Act was designed, in part, to provide "an economi-
cal and efficient system for . . . the disposal of surplus prop-
erty." 63 Stat. 378, 40 U. S. C. §471. In furtherance of 
this policy, federal agencies are directed to maintain ade-
quate inventories of the property under their control and to 
identify excess property for transfer to other agencies able to 
use it. See 63 Stat. 384, 40 U.S. C. §483(b), (c).' Prop-
erty that has outlived its usefulness to the federal govern-
ment is declared "surplus" 2 and may be transferred to pri-
1 The Act defines "excess property" as "property under the control of 
any Federal agency which is not required for its needs and the discharge of 
its responsibilities." 63 Stat. 378, 40 U. S. C. § 472(e). 
2 The Act defines "surplus property" as "any excess property not re-
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vate or other public entities. See generally 63 Stat. 385, as 
amended, 40 U. S. C. § 484. 
The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (now the Secretary of Education 3) to assume 
responsibility for disposing of surplus real property "for 
school, classroom, or other educational use." 63 Stat. 387, 
as amended, 40 U. S. C. §484(k)(1). Subject to the disap-
proval of the Administrator of General Services, the Secre-
tary may sell or lease the property to nonprofit, tax exempt 
educational institutions for consideration that takes into ac-
count "any benefit which has accrued or may accrue to the 
United States" from the transferee's use of the property. 63 
Stat. 387, 40 U. S. C. § 484(k)(1)(A), (C). 4 By regulation, 
the Secretary has provided for the computation of a "public 
benefit allowance," which discounts the transfer price of the 
property "on the basis of benefits to the United States from 
the use of such property for educational purposes." 34 CFR 
§ 12. 9(a) (1980). 5 
The property which spawned this litigation was acquired 
by the Department of the Army in 1942, as part of a larger 
tract of approximately 181 acres of land northwest of Phila-
delphia. The Army built on that land the Valley Forge Gen-
quired for the needs and the discharge of the responsibilities of all Federal 
agencies, as determined by the Administrator [of General Services]." 63 
Stat. 379, 40 U. S. C. § 472(g). 
3 See 20 U.S. C. §§3411, 3441(a)(2)(P) (1976 ed., Supp. III). 
'The property is to "be awarded to the applicant having a program of 
utilization which provides, in the opinion of the Department [of Education], 
the greatest public benefit." 34 CFR § 12.5 (1980). Applicants must be 
willing and able to assume immediate responsibility for the property and 
must demonstrate the financial capacity to implement the approved pro-
gram of educational use. !d. § 12.8(b). 
• In calculating the public benefit allowance, the Secretary considers 
factors such as the applicant's educational accreditation, sponsorship of 
public service training, plans to introduce new instructional programs, 
commitment to student health and welfare, research, and service to the 
handicapped. 34 CFR pt. 12, Exh. A (1980). 
80--327-0PINION 
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eral Hospital, and for 30 years thereafter, that hospital pro-
vided medical care for members of the Armed Forces. In 
April 1973, as part of a plan to reduce the number of military 
installations in the United States, the Secretary of Defense 
proposed to close the hospital, and the General Services Ad-
ministration declared it to be "surplus property." 
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) eventually assumed responsibility for disposing of 
portions of the property, and in August 1976, it conveyed a 
77-acre tract to petitioner, the Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege. 6 The appraised value of the property at the time of 
conveyance was $577,500. 7 This appraised value was dis-
counted, however, by the Secretary's computation of a 100% 
public benefit allowance, which permitted petitioner to ac-
quire the property without making any financial payment for 
it. The deed from HEW conveyed the land in fee simple 
with certain conditions subsequent, which required peti-
tioner to use the property for 30 years solely for the educa-
tional purposes described in petitioner's application. In that 
description, petitioner stated its intention to conduct "a pro-
gram of education . . . meeting the accrediting standards of 
the State of Pennsylvania, The American Association of Bible 
Colleges, the Division of Education of the General Council of 
the Assemblies of God and the Veterans Administration." 
Petitioner is a nonprofit educational institution operating 
under the supervision of a religious order known as the As-
semblies of God. By its own description, petitioner's pur-
pose is "to offer systematic training on the collegiate level to 
men and women for Christian service as either ministers or 
6 The remaining property was conveyed to local school districts for edu-
cational purposes or set aside for park and recreational use. At the time 
of the conveyance, petitioner was known as the Northeast Bible College. 
7 The appraiser placed no value on the buildings and fixtures situated on 
the tract. The buildings had been constructed for use as an army hospital 
and, in his view, the expense necessary to render them useful for other 
purposes would have offset the value of such an endeavor. 
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laymen." App. 34. Its degree programs reflect this ori-
entation by providing courses of study "to train leaders for 
church related ministries." Id., at 102. Faculty members 
must "have been baptized in the Holy Spirit and be living 
consistent Christian lives," id., at 37, and all members of the 
college administration must be affiliated with the Assemblies 
of God, id., at 36. In its application for the 77 -acre tract, pe-
titioner represented that, if it obtained the property, it would 
make "additions to its offerings in the arts and humanities," 
and would strengthen its "psychology" and "counselling" 
courses to provide services in inner city areas. 
In September 1976, respondents Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc. (Americans United), 
and four of its employees, learned of the conveyance through 
a news release. Two months later, they brought suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania to challenge the conveyance on the ground that 
it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. 8 See App. 10. In its amended complaint, Americans 
United described itself as a nonprofit organization composed 
of 90,000 "taxpayer members." The complaint asserted that 
each member "would be deprived of the fair and constitu-
tional use of his (her) tax dollar for constitutional purposes in 
violation of his (her) rights under the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution." Ibid. Respondents 
sought a declaration that the conveyance was null and void, 
and an order compelling petitioner to transfer the property 
back to the United States. Id., at 11. 
On petitioner's motion, the District Court granted sum-
mary judgment and dismissed the complaint. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. A42. The court found that respondents lacked 
standing to sue as taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 
8 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. 
" 
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83 (1968), and had "failed to allege that they have suffered 
any actual or concrete injury beyond a generalized grievance 
common to all taxpayers." App. to Pet. for Cert. A43. 
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, which reversed the judgment of the District 
Court by a divided vote. 619 F. 2d 252 (1980). All mem-
bers of the court agreed that respondents lacked standing as 
taxpayers to challenge the conveyance under Flast v. Cohen, 
supra, since that case extended standing to taxpayers qua 
taxpayers only to challenge congressional exercises of the 
power to tax and spend conferred by Art. I, § 8, of the Con-
stitution, and this conveyance was authorized by legislation 
enacted under the authority of the Property Clause, Art. IV, 
§ 3, cl. 2. Notwithstanding this significant factual difference 
from Flast, the majority of the Court of Appeals found that 
respondents also had standing merely as "citizens," claiming 
"'injury in fact' to their shared individuated right to a gov-
ernment that 'shall make no law respecting the establishment 
of religion."' 619 F. 2d, at 261. In the majority's view, this 
"citizen standing'' was sufficient to satisfy the "case or con-
troversy" requirement of Art. III. One judge, perhaps 
sensing the doctrinal difficulties with the majority's exten-
sion of standing, wrote separately, expressing his view that 
standing was necessary to satisfy "the need for an available 
plaintiff," without whom "the Establishment Clause would be 
rendered virtually unenforceable" by the Judiciary. I d., at 
267, 268. The dissenting judge expressed the view that re-
spondents' allegations constituted a "generalized grievance 
... too abstract to satisfy the injury in fact component of 
standing." I d., at 269. He therefore concluded that their 
standing to contest the transfer was barred by this Court's 
decisions in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the 
War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), and United States v. Richardson, 
418 U. S. 166 (1974). 619 F. 2d, at 270-271. 
Because of the unusually broad and novel view of standing 
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to litigate a substantive question in the federal courts 
adopted by the Court of Appeals, we granted certiorari, 450 
U. S. 909 (1981), and we now reverse. 
II 
Article III of the Constitution limits the "judicial power" of 
the United States to the resolution of "cases" and "controver-
sies." The constitutional power of federal courts cannot be 
defined, and indeed has no substance, without reference to 
the necessity "to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual 
controversies." Liverpool Steamship Co. v. Commissioners 
of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885). The requirements of 
Art. III are not satisfied merely because a party requests a 
court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and has 
couched that request for forms of relief historically associated 
with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those 
trained in the legal process. The judicial power of the 
United States defined by Art. III is not an unconditioned au-
thority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or ex-
ecutive acts. The power to declare the rights of individuals 
and to measure the authority of governments, this Court said 
90 years ago, "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a 
necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital con-
troversy." Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 
U. S. 339, 345 (1892). Otherwise, the power "is not judicial 
. . . in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the 
Constitution to the courts of the United States." United 
States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). 
As an incident to the elaboration of this bedrock require-
ment, this Court has always required that a litigant have 
"standing" to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in 
the lawsuit. The term "standing" subsumes a blend of con-
stitutional requirements and prudential considerations, see 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975), and it has notal-
ways been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particu-
lar features of the "standing'' requirement have been re-
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quired by Art. III ex proprio vigore, or whether they are 
requirements that the Court itself has erected and which 
were not compelled by the language of the Constitution. 
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97. 
A recent line of decisions, however, has resolved that 
ambiguity, at least to the following extent: at an irreducible 
minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's 
authority to "show that he personally has suffered some ac-
tual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal 
conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury "fairly 
can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). 9 In this 
manner does Art. III limit the federal judicial power "to 
those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consis-
tent with a system of separated powers and which are tradi-
tionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judi-
cial process." Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 97. 
The requirement of "actual injury redressable by the 
court," Simon, supra, at 39, serves several of the "implicit 
policies embodied in Article III," Flast, supra, at 96. It 
tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the 
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a de-
bating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to 
a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action. 
The "standing" requirement serves other purposes. Be-
cause it assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant 
9 See Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, - U. S. -, 
- (1981); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261, 262 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 
(1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 
208, 218, 22{}-221 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 
179-180 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 493 (1974); Linda R.S. 
v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617-618 (1973). 
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asserts a claim of injury in fact, a court may decide the case 
with some confidence that its decision will not pave the way 
for lawsuits which have some, but not all, of the facts of the 
case actually decided by the court. 
The Art. III aspect of standing also reflects a due regard 
for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly 
affected by a judicial order. The federal courts have abjured 
appeals to their authority which would convert the judicial 
process into "no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the 
value interests of concerned bystanders." United States v. 
SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). Were the federal courts 
merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public 
grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understand-
ing, the concept of "standing'' would be quite unnecessary. 
But the "cases and controversies" language of Art. III fore-
closes the conversion of courts of the United States into judi-
cial versions of college debating forums. As we said in Si-
erra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972): 
"The requirement that a party seeking review must al-
lege facts showing that he is himself adversely affected 
. . . does serve as at least a rough attempt to put the de-
cision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of 
those who have a direct stake in the outcome." 
The exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect 
the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends, 
is therefore restricted to litigants who can show "injury in 
fact" resulting from the action which they seek to have the 
Court adjudicate. 
The exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships 
between the coequal arms of the national government. The 
effect is, of course, most vivid when a federal court declares 
unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive 
branch. While the exercise of that "ultimate and supreme 
function," Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 
U. S., at 345, is a formidable means of vindicating individual 
80-327-0PINION 
VALLEY FORGE COLLEGE v. AMERICANS UNITED 9 
rights, when employed unwisely or unnecessarily it is also 
the ultimate threat to the continued effectiveness of the fed-
eral courts in performing that role. While the propriety of 
such action by a federal court has been recognized since 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), it has been recog-
nized as a tool of last resort on the part of the federal judi-
ciary throughout its nearly 200 years of existence: 
"[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations be-
tween the life-tenured branch and the representative 
branches of government will not, in the long run, be ben-
eficial to either. The public confidence essential to the 
former and the vitality critical to the latter may well 
erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utiliza-
tion of our power to negative the actions of the other 
branches." United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S., at 
188 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional 
structure requires neither that the judicial branch shrink 
from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of 
the federal government, nor that it hospitably accept for ad-
judication claims of constitutional violation by other branches 
of government where the claimant has not suffered cogni-
zable injury. Thus this Court has "refrain[ed] from passing 
upon the constitutionality of an act [of the representative 
branches] unless obliged to do so in the proper performance 
of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party 
whose interests entitle him to raise it." Blair v. United 
States, 250 U. S. 273, 279 (1919). The importance of this 
precondition should not be underestimated as a means of "de-
fin[ing] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite alloca-
tion of power." Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 95. 
Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judi-
ciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that 
bear on the question of standing. Thus, this Court has held 
that "the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights 
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and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal 
rights or interests of third parties." Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U. S., at 499. 10 In addition, even when the plaintiff has al-
leged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements 
of Art. III, the Court has refrained from adjudicating "ab-
stract questions of wide public significance" which amount to 
"generalized grievances," pervasively shared and most ap-
propriately addressed in the representative branches. I d., 
at 499-500. 11 Finally, the Court has required that the plain-
tiff's complaint fall within "the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee 
in question." Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 
150, 153 (1969). 12 
Merely to articulate these principles is to demonstrate 
their close relationship to the policies reflected in the Art. III 
requirement of actual or threatened injury amenable to judi-
cial remedy. But neither the counsels of prudence nor the 
policies implicit in the "case or controversy" requirement 
should be mistaken for the rigorous Art. III requirements 
themselves. Satisfaction of the former cannot substitute for 
a demonstration of "'distinct and palpable injury' ... that is 
likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted." 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, at 100 
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501). That requirement 
states a limitation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be 
balanced in the weighing of so-called "prudential" 
considerations. 
We need not mince words when we say that the concept of 
"Art. III standing" has not been defined with complete con-
10 See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S., at 100; 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 
U. S., at 80; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 113--114 (1976). 
11 See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, at 100; Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., supra, at 80. 
12 See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, at 100, n. 6; 
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 39, n. 19. 
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sistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court 
which have discussed it, nor when we say that this very fact 
is probably proof that the concept cannot be reduced to a one-
sentence or one-paragraph definition. But of one thing we 
may be sure: Those who do not possess Art. III standing may 
not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States. 13 
Art. III, which is every bit as important in its circumscrip-
tion of the judicial power of the United States as in its grant-
ing of that power, is not merely a troublesome hurdle to be 
overcome if possible so as to reach the "merits" of a lawsuit 
which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the 
basic charter promulgated by the framers of the Constitution 
at Philadelphia in 1787, a charter which created a general 
government, provided for the interaction between that gov-
ernment and the governments of the several States, and was 
later amended so as to either enhance or limit its authority 
with respect to both States and individuals. 
III 
The injury alleged by respondents in their amended com-
plaint is the "depriv[ation] of the fair and constitutional use of 
13 The dissent takes us to task for "tend[ing] merely to obfuscate, rather 
than inform, our understanding of the meaning of rights under the law." 
Post, at--. Were this Court constituted to operate a national classroom 
on "the meaning of rights" for the benefit of interested litigants, this criti-
cism would carry weight. The teaching of Art. III, however, is that con-
stitutional adjudication is available only on terms prescribed by the Con-
stitution, among which is the requirement of a plaintiff with standing to 
sue. The dissent asserts that this requirement "overrides no other provi-
sion of the Constitution," id., at--, but just as surely the Art. III power 
of the federal courts does not wax and wane in harmony with a litigant's 
desire for a "hospitable forum," id., at--. Art. III obligates a federal 
court to act only when it is assured of the power to do so, that is, when it is 
called upon to resolve an actual case or controversy. Then, and only then, 
may it turn its attention to other constitutional provisions and presume to 
provide a forum for the adjudication of rights. See Ashwander v. Tennes-
see Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
·. 
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[their] tax dollar." J.A. 10. 14 As a result, our discussion 
must begin with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 
(1923). In that action a taxpayer brought suit challenging 
the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921, which pro-
vided federal funding to the States for the purpose of improv-
ing maternal and infant health. The injury she alleged con-
sisted of the burden of taxation in support of an 
unconstitutional regime, which she characterized as a depri-
vation of property without due process. "Looking through 
forms of words to the substance of [the] complaint," the 
Court concluded that the only "injury" was the fact "that offi-
cials of the executive branch of the government are executing 
and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitu-
tional." I d., at 488. Any tangible effect of the challenged 
statute on the plaintiff's tax burden was "remote, fluctuating, 
and uncertain." Id., at 487. In rejecting this as a cogni-
zable injury sufficient to establish standing, the Court 
admonished: 
"The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] 
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid 
but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforce-
ment, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite 
way in common with people generally. . . . Here the 
parties plaintiff have no such case." I d., at 488. 
Following the decision in Frothingham, the Court con-
firmed that the expenditure of public funds in an allegedly 
"Respondent Americans United has alleged no injury to itself as an 
organization, distinct from injury to its taxpayer members. As a result, 
its claim to standing can be no different from those of the members it seeks 
to represent. The question is whether "its members, or any one of them, 
are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged 
action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members 
themselves brought suit." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 511. See Si-
mon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 40; Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739-741 (1972). 
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unconstitutional manner is not an injury sufficient to confer 
standing, even though the plaintiff contributes to the public 
coffers as a taxpayer. In Doremus v. Board of Education, 
342 U. S. 429 (1952), plaintiffs brought suit as citizens and 
taxpayers, claiming that a New Jersey law which authorized 
public school teachers in the classroom to read passages from 
the Bible violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of 
standing: 
"This Court has held that the interests of a taxpayer in 
the moneys of the federal treasury are too indetermin-
able, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis for 
an appeal to the preventive powers of the Court over 
their manner of expenditure. . . . Without disparaging 
the availability of the remedy by taxpayer's action to re-
strain unconstitutional acts which result in direct pecuni-
ary injury, we reiterate what the Court said of a federal 
statute as equally true when a state Act is assailed: 'The 
party who invokes the power must be able to show not 
only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained 
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct in-
jury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that 
he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people 
generally."' !d., at 433-434 (quoting Frothingham v. 
Mellon, supra, at 488) (citations omitted). 
In short, the Court found that plaintiffs' grievance was "not a 
direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a religious difference." 
I d., at 434. A case or controversy did not exist, even though 
the "clash of interests [was] real and ... strong." !d., at 
436 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
The Court again visited the problem of taxpayer standing 
in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968). The taxpayer plain-
tiffs in Flast sought to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds 
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 
which they alleged were being used to support religious 
schools in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court 
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developed a two-part test to determine whether the plaintiffs 
had standing to sue. First, because a taxpayer alleges in-
jury only by virtue of his liability for taxes, the Court held 
that "a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the uncon-
stitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under 
the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitu-
tion." !d., at 102. Second, the Court required the taxpayer 
to "show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific con-
stitutional limitations upon the exercise of the taxing and 
spending power and not simply that the enactment is gener-
ally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8." 
Id., at 102--103. 
The plaintiffs in Flast satisfied this test because "[t]heir 
constitutional challenge [was] made to an exercise by Con-
gress of its power under Art. I, § 8, to spend for the general 
welfare," id., at 103, and because the Establishment Clause, 
on which plaintiffs' complaint rested, "operates as a specific 
constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the 
taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, §8," id., at 
104. The Court distinguished Frothingham v. Mellon, 
supra, on the ground that Mrs. Frothingham had relied, not 
on a specific limitation on the power to tax and spend, but on 
a more general claim based on the Due Process Clause. !d., 
at 105. Thus, the Court reaffirmed that the "case or contro-
versy" aspect of standing is unsatisfied "where a taxpayer 
seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his 
generalized grievances about the conduct of government or 
the allocation of power in the Federal System." I d., at 106. 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Flast, respondents fail the first 
prong of the test for taxpayer standing. Their claim is defi-
cient in two respects. First, the source of their complaint is 
not a congressional action, but a decision by HEW to transfer 
a parcel of federal property. 15 Flast limited taxpayer stand-
15 Respondents do not challenge the constitutionality of the Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act itself, but rather a particular 
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ing to challenges directed "only [at] exercises of congres-
sional power." Id., at 102. See Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 228 (1974) (deny-
ing standing because the taxpayer plaintiffs "did not chal-
lenge an enactment under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of 
the Executive Branch"). 
Second, and perhaps redundantly, the property transfer 
about which respondents complain was not an exercise of au-
thority conferred by the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, 
§ 8. The authorizing legislation, the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act of 1949, was an evident exercise 
of Congress' power under the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, 
cl. 2. 16 Respondents do not dispute this conclusion, see Brief 
for Respondents 10, and it is decisive of any claim of taxpayer 
standing under the Flast precedent. 17 
Executive branch action arguably authorized by the Act. 
16 The Act was designed "to simplify the procurement, utilization, and 
disposal of Government property" in order to achieve an "efficient, busi-
nesslike system of property management." S. Rep. No. 475, 81st Cong., 
1st Sess., p. 1 (1949). See H. R. Rep. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 
1-2 (1949). Among the central purposes of the Act was the "maximum 
utilization of property already owned by the Government and the minimum 
purchasing of new property." S. Rep. No. 475, supra, at 4. Congress 
recognized, however, that from time to time certain property would be-
come surplus to the government, and in particular, property acquired by 
the military to meet wartime contingencies. Congress provided a means 
of disposing of this property to meet well-recognized public priorities, in-
cluding education. See S. Rep. No. 475, supra, at 4-5; H.R. Rep. No. 
670, supra, at 5-6. 
17 Although not necessary to our decision, we note that any connection 
between the challenged property transfer and respondents' tax burden is 
at best speculative and at worst nonexistent. Although public funds were 
expended to establish the Valley Forge General Hospital, the land was ac-
quired and the facilities constructed thirty years prior to the challenged 
transfer. Respondents do not challenge this expenditure, and we do not 
immediately perceive how such a challenge might now be raised. Nor do 
respondents dispute the government's conclusion that the property has be-
come useless for federal purposes and ought to be disposed of in some pro-
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Any doubt that once might have existed concerning the 
rigor with which the Flast exception to the Frothingham 
principle ought to be applied should have been erased by this 
Court's recent decisions in United States v. Richardson, 418 
U. S. 166 (1974), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to 
Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974). In Richardson, the 
question was whether the plaintiff had standing as a federal 
taxpayer to argue that legislation which permitted the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency to withhold from the public detailed 
information about its expenditures violated the Accounts 
Clause of the Constitution. 18 We rejected plaintiff's claim of 
standing because "his challenge [was] not addressed to the 
taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating the 
CIA." 418 U. S., at 175. The "mere recital" of those claims 
"demonstrate[ d) how far he [fell] short of the standing crite-
ria of Flast and how neatly he [fell] within the Frothingham 
holding left undisturbed." I d., at 17 4-175. 
The claim in Schlesinger was marred by the same defi-
ciency. Plaintiffs in that case argued that the Incompatibil-
ductive manner. In fact, respondents' only objection is that the govern-
ment did not receive adequate consideration for the transfer, because 
petitioner's use of the property will not confer a public benefit. See Brief 
for Respondents 13. Assuming arguendo that this proposition is true, an 
assumption by no means clear, there is no basis for believing that a trans-
fer to a different purchaser would have added to government receipts. As 
the government argues, "the ultimate purchaser would, in all likelihood, 
have been another non-profit institution or local school district rather than 
a purchaser for cash." Brief for United States 30. Moreover, each year 
of delay in disposing of the property depleted the Treasury by the amounts 
necessary to maintain a facility that had lost its value to the government. 
Even if respondents had brought their claim within the outer limits of 
Flast, therefore, they still would have encountered serious difficulty in 
establishing that they "personally would benefit in a tangible way from the 
court's intervention." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 508. 
'
8 U. S. Canst., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("[A]nd a regular Statement and Ac-
count of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be pub-
lished from time to time"). 
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ity Clause of Art. I 19 prevented certain Members of Congress 
from holding commissions in the Armed Forces Reserve. 
We summarily rejected their assertion of standing as taxpay-
ers because they "did not challenge an enactment under Art. 
I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch in per-
mitting Members of Congress to maintain their Reserve sta-
tus." 418 U. S., at 228. 
Respondents, therefore, are plainly without standing to 
sue as taxpayers. The Court of Appeals apparently reached 
the same conclusion. It remains to be seen whether re-
spondents have alleged any other basis for standing to bring 
this suit. 
IV 
Although the Court of Appeals properly doubted respon-
dents' ability to establish standing solely on the basis of their 
taxpayer status, it considered their allegations of taxpayer 
injury to be "essentially an assumed role." 619 F. 2d, at 261. 
"Plaintiffs have no reason to expect, nor perhaps do they 
care about, any personal tax saving that might result 
should they prevail. The crux of the interest at stake, 
the plaintiffs argue, is found in the Establishment 
Clause, not in the supposed loss of money as such. As a 
matter of primary identity, therefore, the plaintiffs are 
not so much taxpayers as separationists .... " Ibid. · 
In the court's view, respondents had established standing by 
virtue of an "'injury in fact' to their shared individuated right 
to a government that 'shall make no law respecting the estab-
lishment of religion.'" Ibid. The court distinguished this 
"injury" from "the question of 'citizen standing' as such." 
I d., at 262. Although citizens generally could not establish 
standing simply by claiming an interest in governmental ob-
19 U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under 
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continu-
ance in Office"). 
80-327-0PINION 
18 VALLEY FORGE COLLEGE v. AMERICANS UNITED 
servance of the Constitution, respondents had "set forth in-
stead a particular and concrete injury" to a "personal con-
stitutional right." I d., at 265. 
The Court of Appeals was surely correct in recognizing 
that the Art. III requirements of standing are not satisfied 
by "the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution 
asserted by . . . citizens." Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Commmittee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 223, n. 3. This 
Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated 
on "'the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the 
Government be administered according to law .... ' Fair-
child v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129 [1922]." Baker v. Carr, 
369 U. S. 186, 208 (1962). See Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Commmittee to Stop the War, supra, at 216-222; Laird v. Ta-
tum, 408 U. S. 1 (1972); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937). 
Such claims amount to little more than attempts "to employ a 
federal court as a forum in which to air ... generalized griev-
ances ·about the conduct of government." Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U. S., at 106. 
In finding that respondents had alleged something more 
than "the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional 
governance," Schlesinger, supra, at 217, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on factual differences which we do not think 
amount to legal distinctions. The court decided that respon-
dents' claim differed from those in Schlesinger and Richard-
son, which were predicated, respectively, on the Incompati-
bility and Accounts Clauses, because "it is at the very least 
arguable that the Establishment Clause creates in each citi-
zen a 'personal constitutional right' to a government that 
does not establish religion." 619 F. 2d, at 265 (footnote 
omitted). The court found it unnecessary to determine 
whether this "arguable" proposition was correct, since it 
judged the mere allegation of a legal right sufficient to confer 
standing. 
This reasoning process merely disguises, we think with a 
rather thin veil, the inconsistency of the court's results with 
"' 
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our decisions in Schlesinger and Richardson. The plaintiffs 
in those cases plainly asserted a "personal right" to have the 
government act in accordance with their views of the Con-
stitution; indeed, we see no barrier to the assertion of such 
claims with respect to any constitutional provision. But as-
sertion of a right to a particular kind of government conduct, 
which the government has violated by acting differently, can-
not alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without drain-
ing those requirements of meaning. 
Nor can Schlesinger and Richardson be distinguished on 
the ground that the Incompatibility and Accounts Clauses are 
in some way less "fundamental" than the Establishment 
Clause. Each establishes a norm of conduct which the fed-
eral government is bound to honor-to no greater or lesser 
extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution. To the 
extent the Court of Appeals relied on a view of standing un-
der which the Art. III burdens diminish as the "importance" 
of the claim on the merits increases, we reject that notion. 
The requirement of standing "focuses on the party seeking to 
get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues 
he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 
99. Moreover, we know of no principled basis on which to 
create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a comple-
mentary "sliding scale" of standing which might permit re-
spondents to invoke the judicial power of the United States. 20 
20 The dissent is premised on a revisionist reading of our precedents 
which leads to the conclusion that the Art. III requirement of standing is 
satisfied by any taxpayer who contends "that the federal government has 
exceeded the bounds of the law in allocating its largesse," post, at --. 
"The concept of taxpayer injury necessarily recognizes the continuing 
stake of the taxpayer in the disposition of the Treasury to which he has 
contributed his taxes, and his right to have those funds put to lawful uses." 
I d. , at-. On this novel understanding, the dissents reads cases such as 
Frothingham and Flast as decisions on the merits of the taxpayers' claims. 
Frothingham is explained as a holding that a taxpayer ordinarily has no 
legal right to challenge congressional expenditures. I d., at --. The 
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"The proposition that all constitutional provisions are en-
forceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ulti-
mate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries." 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra, 
at 227. 
The complaint in this case shares a common deficiency with 
those in Schlesinger and Richardson. Although they claim 
dissent divines from Flast the holding that a taxpayer does have an en-
forceable right "to challenge a federal bestowal of largesse" for religious 
purposes. I d., at --. This right extends to "the Government as a 
whole, regardless of which branch is at work in a particular instance," id., 
at--, and regardless of whether the challenged action was an exercise of 
the spending power, id., at----
However appealing this reconstruction of precedent may be, it bears lit-
tle resemblance to the cases on which it purports to rest. Frothingham 
and Flast were decisions that plainly turned on standing, and just as 
plainly they rejected any notion that the Art. III requirement of direct in-
jury is satisfied by a taxpayer who contends "that .the federal government 
has exceeded the bounds of the law in allocating its largesse." I d., at 
--. Moreover, although the dissent's view may lead to a result satisfy-
ing to many in this case, it is not evident how its substitution of "legal in-
terest," id., at--, for "standing" enhances "our understanding of the 
meaning of rights under law," id., at --. Logically, the dissent must 
shoulder the burden of explaining why taxpayers with standing have no 
"legal interest" in congressional expenditures except when it is possible to 
allege a violation of the Establishment Clause: yet it does not attempt to do 
so. 
Nor does the dissent's interpretation of standing adequately explain 
cases such as Schlesinger and Richardson. According to the dissent, the 
taxpayer plaintiffs in those cases lacked standing, not because they failed 
to challenge an exercise of the spending power, but because they did not 
complain of "the distribution of government largesse." I d., at --. And 
yet if the standing of a taxpayer is established by his "continuing stake . . . 
in the disposition of the Treasury to which he has contributed his taxes," 
id., at --, it would seem to follow that he can assert a right to examine 
the budget of the CIA, as in Richardson, see 418 U. 8., at 211, and a right 
to argue that members of Congress cannot claim reserve pay from the gov-
ernment, as in Schlesinger, see 418 U. 8. , at 211. Of course, both claims 
have been rejected, precisely because Art. III requires a demonstration of 
redressable injury that is not satisfied by a claim that tax monies have been 
spent unlawfully. 
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that the Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing 
else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by 
the plaintiffs as a consequence of the alleged constitutional 
error, other than the psychological consequence presumably 
produced by observation of conduct with which one dis-
agrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing 
under Art. III, even though the disagreement is phrased in 
constitutional terms. It is evident that respondents are 
firmly committed to the constitutional principle of separation 
of church and State, but standing is not measured by the in-
tensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy. 
"[T]hat concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta-
tion of issues," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204, is the antici-
pated consequence of proceedings commenced by one who 
has been injured in fact; it is not a permissible substitute for 
the showing of injury itself. 21 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not retreat from our ear-
lier holdings-that standing may be predicated on noneconomic 
mJury. See, e. g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 
686-688; Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S., at 
153-154. We simply cannot see that respondents have al-
leged an injury of any kind, economic or otherwise, sufficient 
to confer standing. 22 Respondents complain of a transfer of 
21 In Schlesinger, we rejected the argument that standing should be rec-
ognized because "the adverse parties sharply conflicted in their interests 
and views and were supported by able briefs and arguments." 418 U. S., 
at 225: 
"We have no doubt about the sincerity of respondents' stated objectives 
and the depth of their commitment to them. But the essence of standing 
'is not a question of motivation but of possession of the requisite . . . inter-
est that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct.' 
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952).'' !d., at 
225-226. 
22 Respondents rely on our statement in Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 
397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970), that "[a] person or family may have a spiritual 
stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise issues 
concerning the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Ab-
ington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 [1963]." Respondents 
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property located in Chester County, Pennsylvania. The 
named plaintiffs reside in Maryland and Virginia;23 their orga-
nizational headquarters are located in Washington, D.C. 
They learned of the transfer through a news release. Their 
claim that the government has violated the Establishment 
Clause does not provide a special license to roam the country 
in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their dis-
apparently construe this language to mean that any person asserting an 
Establishment Clause violation possesses a "spiritual stake" sufficient to 
confer standing. The language will not bear that weight. First, the lan-
guage cannot be read apart from the context of its accompanying reference 
to Abington School District v. Schempp, supra. In Schempp, the Court 
invalidated laws that required Bible reading in the public schools. Plain-
tiffs were children who attended the schools in question, and their parents. 
The Court noted: 
"It goes without saying that the laws and practices involved here can be 
challenged only by persons having standing to complain . .. . The parties 
here are school children and their parents, who are directly affected by the 
laws and practices against which their complaints are directed. These in-
terests surely suffice to give the parties standing to complain." I d., at 
224, n. 9. 
The Court also drew a comparison with Doremus v. Board of Education, 
342 U. S. 429 (1952), in which the identical substantive issues were raised, 
but in which the appeal was "dismissed upon the graduation of the school 
child involved and because of the appellants' failure to establish standing as 
taxpayers." 374 U. S., at 224, n. 9. The Court's discussion of the stand-
ing issue is not extensive, but it is sufficient to show the error in respon-
dents' broad reading of the phrase "spiritual stake." The plaintiffs in 
Schemmp had standing, not because their complaint rested on the Estab-
lishment Clause-for as Doremus demonstrated, that is insufficient-but 
because impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome reli-
gious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them. 
Respondents have alleged no comparable injury. 
23 Respondent Americans United claims that it has certain unidentified 
members who reside in Pennsylvania. It does not explain, however, how 
this fact establishes a cognizable injury where none existed before. Re-
spondent is still obligated to allege facts sufficient to establish that one or 
more of its members has suffered, or is threatened with, an injury other 
than their belief that the transfer violated the Constitution. 
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coveries in federal court. 24 The federal courts were simply 
not constituted as ombudsmen of the general welfare. 
v 
The Court of Appeals in this case ignored unambiguous 
limitations on taxpayer and citizen standing. It appears to 
have done so out of the conviction that enforcement of the 
Establishment Clause demands special exceptions from the 
requirement that a plaintiff allege "'distinct and palpable in-
jury to himself,' ... that is likely to be redressed if the re-
quested relief is granted." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U. S., at 501). The court derived precedential comfort from 
Flast v. Cohen, supra: "The underlying justification for ac-
cording standing in Flast it seems, was the implicit recogni-
tion that the Establishment Clause does create in every citi-
zen a personal constitutional right, such that any citizen, 
including taxpayers, may contest under that clause the con-
stitutionality of federal expenditures." 619 F. 2d, at 262. 25 
24 Respondents also claim standing by reference to the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702 (1976), which authorizes judicial review at 
the instance of any person who has been "adversely affected or aggrieved 
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." Neither the 
Administrative Procedure Act, nor any other congressional enactment, can 
lower the threshold requirements of standing under Art. Ill. See, e. g., 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S., at 100; Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501. Respondents do not allege that the Act creates 
a legal right, "the invasion of which creates standing," Linda R .S . v. Rich-
ard D., 410 U. S., at 617, n. 3., and there is no other basis for arguing that 
its existence alters the rules of standing otherwise applicable to this case. 
25 The majority believed that the only thing which prevented this Court 
from openly acknowledging this position was the fact that the complaint in 
Flast had alleged no basis for standing other than the plaintiffs' taxpayer 
status. 619 F. 2d, at 262. As the dissent below pointed out, this view is 
simply not in accord with the facts. See id., at 269--270. The Flast plain-
tiffs and several amici strongly urged the Court to adopt the same view of 
standing for which respondents argue in this case. The Court plainly 
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The concurring opinion was even more direct. In its view, 
"statutes alleged to violate the Establishment Clause may 
not have an individual impact sufficient to confer standing in 
the traditional sense." I d., at 268. To satisfy "the ne~d for 
an available plaintiff," id., at 267, and thereby to assure a ba-
sis for judicial review, respondents should be granted stand-
ing because, "as a practical matter, no one is better suited to 
bring this lawsuit and thus vindicate the freedoms embodied 
in the Establishment Clause," id., at 266. 
Implicit in the foregoing is the philosophy that the business 
of the federal courts is correcting constitutional errors, and 
that "cases and controversies" are at best merely convenient 
vehicles for doing so and at worst nuisances that may be dis-
pensed with when they become obstacles to that transcen-
dent endeavor. This philosophy has no place in our constitu-
tional scheme. It does not become more palatable when the 
underlying merits concern the Establishment Clause. Re-
spondents' claim of standing implicitly rests on the presump-
tion that violations of the Establishment Clause typically will 
not cause injury sufficient to confer standing under the "tra-
ditional" view of Art. III. But "[t]he assumption that if re-
spondents have no standing to sue, no one would have stand-
ing, is not a reason to find standing." Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 227. 
This view would convert standing into a requirement that 
must be observed only when satisfied. Moreover, we are 
unwilling to assume that injured parties are nonexistent sim-
ply because they have not joined respondents in their suit. 
The law of averages is not a substitute for standing. 
Were we to accept respondents' claim of standing in this 
case, there would be no principled basis for confining our ex-
chose not to do so. Even if respondents were correct in arguing that the 
Court in Flast was bound by a "perceived limitation in the pleadings," id. , 
at 262, we are not so bound in this case, and we find no merit in respon-
dents' vision of standing. 
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ception to litigants relying on the Establishment Clause. 
Ultimately, that exception derives from the idea that the ju-
dicial power requires nothing more for its invocation than im-
portant issues and able litigants. 26 The existence of injured 
parties who might not wish to bring suit becomes irrelevant. 
Because we are unwilling to countenance such a departure 
from the limits on judicial power contained in Art. III, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
26 Were we to recognize standing premised on an "injury" consisting 
solely of an alleged violation of a "'personal constitutional right' to a gov-
ernment that does not establish religion," 619 F. 2d, at 265, a principled 
consistency would dictate recognition of respondents' standing to challenge 
execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a personal right to a gov-
ernment that does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to 
challenge every affirmative action program on the basis of a personal right 
to a government that does not deny equal protection of the laws, to choose 
but two among as many possible examples as there are commands in the 
Constitution. 
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